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Abstract
This thesis will explore three major areas of political science research: The timing
of elections, Duverger' s law and voter turnout. Each of these topics has been covered
extensively in the literature. However, as with most areas of political science, there
remain facets of each of these topics that deserve further examination. Chapter 1 begins
this discussion with an introduction to each of these three topics and a description of the
Canadian electoral and party systems.
Chapter 2 examines the impact of the timing of elections on the government party
in Canadian parliamentary elections. This chapter shows that there are aspects of the
study of election timing in presidential regimes that also pertain to the study of election
timing in parliamentary regimes. In particular, this chapter finds that the "honeymoon
period" described by Shugart and Carey (1992) and Shugart (1995) for presidential
regimes relates to early election calls by the government in parliamentary regimes. The
issues of sample size and susceptibility to operationalization limit the explanatory power
of the analysis in this chapter. While these results show that future research in this area is
warranted, these problems must be addressed in order to enhance these initial findings.
Du verger's law states that "the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the
two-party system" (1964, 217). An important implication of the law is that the electoral
system is a significant determinant of the number of parties. Chapter 3 shows that even
when multi-partism appears at the national level, the district level can present a different
picture depending on how the number of parties is counted. This number of competitive
parties is determined by using the same LT index method as Gaines (1999). Using this
vote share method, the results for the 1997 and the 2000 election confirm the pattern

established by Gaines for the elections from 1935 through 1993. By using seat shares
instead of vote shares in the LT index, I find that Canadian elections at the riding level
are more appropriately characterized as two-party or even one-party competition. This
finding, which is the most significant contribution of this chapter, concurs with
Duverger's (1964) hypothesis that Canadian exceptionalism at the national level is the
result of different regional parties competing with national parties in different regions of
the country.
There are two main methods that are used to study voter turnout. Single country
studies, particularly in the case of the U.S., tend to focus on socioeconomic and
behavioral variables while comparative studies tend to favor an analysis of institutional
variables. In Chapter 4, I present an analysis of voter turnout using a combination of the
two approaches. Chapter 4 presents a longitudinal analysis of Canadian turnout using the
institutional variables explored in Chapters 2 and 3 as well as a snapshot analysis of the
1997 Canadian election. I use regional analysis to demonstrate the problem with using an
aggregate analysis to explain a phenomenon that is affected by different variables in
different regions. This analysis shows that different independent variables have a
distinctly different effect on voter turnout in different regions. When combined in an
aggregate analysis, these independent variables lose some of their explanatory power
because of the contradictory effects observed in different regions.
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Chapter 1
Canada: The Electoral System and Political Parties

Introduction
Within the voting behavior and the party development literature, there is a vast
array of approaches and methods used to analyze the relationship of voting, parties and
the electoral system. One of the major divisions in these literatures is between a
behavioral and an institutional approach. While this thesis combines the two approaches
in the analysis of voter turnout, the thesis is largely based on an institutional approach
focusing on the impact that electoral system design and its consequences have on the
development of the party system and government formation.
This thesis will explore three major areas of political science research: The timing
of elections, Du verger's law and voter turnout. Each of these topics has been covered
extensively in the literature. However, as with most areas of political science, there
remain facets of each of these topics that deserve further examination. There is also a
substantial amount of interconnectedness between these areas as they relate to party
development and voting behavior which is one of the major focuses of this work.
The largest body of work regarding the impact that the timing of elections has on
government formation has focussed on presidential regimes and the effect of concurrent
versus non-concurrent elections (Scheve and Tomz 1999; Shugart and Carey 1992;
Shugart 1995). The parliamentary literature relating to election timing focuses on the use
of no confidence votes or the policy making decisions of governments rather than the
effect that election timing has on the electoral fortunes of parties (Huber 1996; Huber and

McCarty 2001; Johnston 1999; Petry et. al. 1999). There are institutional differences
between presidentialism and parliamentarism that can account for some of the divergence
in the research involving election timing. In a parliamentary regime, executive and
legislative elections are always simultaneous while in a presidential regime that is not
necessarily the case due to the separate nature of the two branches. Chapter 2 shows that
there are aspects of the study of election timing in presidential regimes that also pertain to
the study of election timing in parliamentary regimes. In particular, this chapter finds
that the "honeymoon period" described by Shugart and Carey (1992) and Shugart (1995)
for presidential regimes relates to early election calls by the government in parliamentary
regimes.
Chapter 3 focuses on Duverger's law which has been the subject of a large body
of literature. Du verger's law states that "the simple-majority single-ballot system favours
the two-party system" (1964, 217). An important implication of the law is that the
electoral system is a significant determinant of the number of parties. The explanation
put forth by Duverger for countries that appeared to be exceptions was that while
multipartism may exist at the national level, it is the result of two-party competition at the
district level with different parties receiving support in different regions. Chapter 3
shows that even when multipartism appears at the national level, the district level can
present a different picture depending on how the number of parties is counted. The
generally accepted method for counting parties in political science is the LT index
(described in detail in Chapter 3 and the Appendix). The problem with this index
involves choosing which measure to use in the calculation. While most scholars use vote
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shares, I demonstrate that using shares of seats won generates a significantly different
result and may be a more appropriate method for counting parties.
There are two main methods that are used to study voter turnout. Single country
studies, particularly in the case of the U.S., tend to focus on socioeconomic and
behavioral variables while comparative studies tend to favor an analysis of institutional
variables. In Chapter 4, I present an analysis of voter turnout using a combination of the
two approaches. Both the time between elections which was the independent variable in
Chapter 2 and the number of competitive parties which was the dependent variable in
Chapter 3 are used as independent variables in the voter turnout analysis.
While each of these three chapters has a national level analysis at their core, there
is also a strong regional component involved in Chapters 3 and 4. In the case of Chapter
3, a regional analysis is used to develop a response to Duverger's contention that
regionalism is the explanation for Canadian exceptionalism. In Chapter 4, I use regional
analysis to demonstrate the problem with using an aggregate analysis to explain a
phenomenon that is affected by different variables in different regions. This analysis
shows that different independent variables have a distinctly different effect on voter
turnout in different regions. When combined in an aggregate analysis, these independent
variables lose some of their explanatory power because of the contradictory effects
observed in different regions.
While each of these chapters discuss very different topics there is a common
theme binding them together. Each of the topics analyzed in this thesis is assumed to be
heavily influenced by electoral system design. The design of the electoral system allows
for the three possible means for calling an election that are discussed in Chapter 2. A key
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component of the analysis in Chapter 3 is Duverger's contention that the design of the
electoral system is the primary determinant of the number of parties. The timing of
elections, number of competitive parties and margin of victory are all influenced by the
electoral system design and appear as independent variables in the analysis of voter
turnout in Chapter 4. Therefore, even though each chapter represents a separate analysis,
the electoral system and its consequences figure prominently in the conclusions of each
chapter.
Canada and Its Regions
In order to analyze the three topics discussed above, I have drawn on several
elections from Canada. There are several reasons why Canadian elections are an
appropriate sample for this analysis. First and foremost, I believe that Canada is an
understudied country within American political science. Canada has one of the longest
running uninterrupted democracies in the world and has a population of roughly thirtyTable 1.1
Canada Population Breakdown as of2001
Province/Territory
Newfoundland
Prince Edward Island
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
Yukon*
Northwest Territories*
Nunavut*

Population
533,761
138,514
942,691
757,077
7,410,504
11,874,436
1,150,034
1,015,783
3,064,249
4,095,934
29,885
40,860
28,159

Canada

31,081,887

Note:
* Indicates territory
Source: Statistics Canada Website <www.statcan.ca>.
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one million people residing in ten provinces and three territories (see Figure 1.1 for a map
of Canada and Table 1.1 for a population breakdown by province and territory).
Canada is an appropriate country to use for the election timing analysis in Chapter
2 because it has had elections called for various reasons (e.g., reaching the maximum
time allowable between elections, the government calling early elections and the
government being forced to hold early elections due to the loss of a no confidence vote in
parliament).
Figure 1.1
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Canada is often cited as an exception to Duverger's law. Duverger himself
recognized this potential problem and argued that regionalism in Canadian politics could
provide the explanation for that apparent exception. For this reason, as well as the fact
that Gaines (1999) presents an analysis of Canadian exceptionalism to Duverger's law,
Canada provides an appropriate subject of the analysis in Chapter 3.
Since I am including the variables of time between elections and the number of
competitive parties that are analyzed in Chapters 2 and 3 as independent variables in the
voter turnout analysis presented in Chapter 4, it is logical to further develop continuity by
using Canada as the subject of that analysis as well. Finally, another reason for this study
is the abundance of data available for Canada regarding each of the topics for the period
from 1935 to 2000.
For the purposes of a regional study in Chapter 4, the provinces of Ontario,
Quebec and British Columbia will each represent a region while Newfoundland, Prince
Edward Island, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick will be grouped together as the
Maritime Provinces, and Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta will be grouped together
as the Prairie Provinces. Due to the fact that each of the territories (e.g., Yukon,
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut) consists of only one electoral district, they are not
included in any regional analysis but are factored into the aggregate totals.
Canadian Electoral System and Government Formation
Canada has a parliamentary system of government modeled on the British system
that currently has 301 electoral districts that are called ridings. The number of ridings has
grown from 245 since 1935 (the first year that is involved in my analysis). Each of the
ridings sends one representative to the national parliament. Those representatives are
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elected based on a single ballot, simple-majority electoral formula, in which the candidate
that receives the most votes wins. Once the representatives have been elected, the party
that holds the majority of seats selects the prime minister (who in tum chooses the rest of
the cabinet). In the absence of a majority party, there are two options. Either a group of
two or more parties will align themselves together in order to form a coalition
government, or a minority government will be formed. However, there has not been a
coalition government in Canada since World War I so all of the governments under
consideration in this study are either single majority or minority governments.
The maximum time allowed between elections in Canada is five years. Unlike
presidential regimes that have fixed election times, most parliamentary regimes have
provisions for the calling of early elections. In the case of Canada, this can come about
in two ways. The government can be forced to hold early elections if they lose a
confidence vote in the parliament, or the government can choose to call the elections
early.
Canadian Political Parties
Throughout the 1935 to 2000 period, there have been only two parties that have
formed the government of Canada (for a listing of the major Canadian political parties
see Table 1.2). The Liberal Party (LP) and the Conservative Party (now known as the
Progressive Conservative Party or PC) have been the two mainstays among the party
competition during this period. While other parties have come and gone, the LP and PC
have been represented in each parliament included in this study. Several other parties
have been represented periodically including the Social Credit Party (SCP), the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), the New Democratic Party (NDP), the Bloc
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Quebecois (BQ) and the Canadian Alliance Party or CAP (formerly known as the Reform
Party or RP). The current parliament contains representatives from the LP, PC, BQ, NDP
and CAP parties. The SCP is no longer in existence, and the CCF evolved into the NDP.
As with many democracies, there are also minor parties that receive votes but have never
seriously challenged to become a political force. This presents a sharp contrast to the
American system in which only the Republican and Democratic parties have had
significant representation since the mid 1800's. While the electoral systems are similar,
the Canadian party system has demonstrated much greater fluidity than the American
party system (though Canada has also had an extended period in which only two parties
have formed the government).
Table 1.2
Canadian Political Parties

Abbreviation
LP
PC
CCF/NDP

Party Name
Liberal Party
Progressive Conservatives
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation I
New Democratic Party
Social Credit Party

SCP

Reform Party I Canadian Alliance Party
Bloc Quebecois

RP/CAP
BQ

Years in
Parliament1
1935 1935 1935 1935 - 1957
1962 - 1979
1993 1993 -

Note:
1Years in parliament represent only the years that are included in this study.
Sources: Munroe Eagles, James P. Bickerton, Alain G. Gagnon, and Patrick J. Smith. 1995. The Almanac
of Canadian Politics. 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press., Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 19351988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada.

As with much of the Canadian political system, the ideological basis for the
political parties is largely based on the country's European heritage and the influence of
the U.S. The British welfare state and ideas regarding the social responsibilities of
government that were held by its founders are cornerstones for the ideology of the LP
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(Christian and Campbell 1990). This party has been the most consistently successful
party during the twentieth century. Out of the twenty governments included in this study,
fourteen of them were formed by the LP. The six times that they did not form the
government, they were the largest opposition party.
The ideological stance of the PC was heavily influenced by the British Tory Party
in its earlier stages and later on by Reaganomics and neo-conservatism from the U.S.
(Christian and Campbell 1990). The Conservatives were the second most successful
party during most of the 1935 to 2000 period. They were able to form the government
six times and were the largest opposition party eleven times. The PC's fortunes changed
dramatically in the 1993 election in which they lost 167 seats and for the first time were
no longer either the government or opposition party. This was partly due to the formation
of the ideologically similar RP.
European socialism also played a role in shaping the ideology of some Canadian
political parties. The British Labour Party provided much of the inspiration for the SCP
and CCF parties (Christian and Campbell 1990). As the NDP was replacing the CCF and
SCP parties, its leaders turned to the Swedish socialist government, the German Social
Democrats and the Mitterand government in France for ideological guidance and ideas
(Christian and Campbell 1990). None of these parties ever achieved the level of electoral
success necessary to form a government or serve as the opposition, but at various times,
they were each able to achieve a consistent level of representation allowing them to
influence government.
A more recent development in Canadian political parties is the emergence of
parties with a highly regional base of support and ideology. Beginning with the Parti
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Quebecois (PQ) at the provincial level in Quebec and growing with the formation of the
BQ at the national level, Quebec separatism has formed the foundation of a substantial
political movement. Both of these parties run candidates solely within the province of
Quebec. The PQ has served as the government of Quebec on multiple occasions since
they first rose to power in 1976. The BQ received its largest share of seats in a stunning
result in the 1993 general election in which they won enough seats to serve in the position
of the opposition party (this came after the close vote in the 1992 Quebec referendum for
independence).
The RP came into existence mainly as a splinter from the PC helping to cause its
1993 collapse and consisting mainly of representatives from the western provinces.
While western separatism has been an issue, the RP also represented the more
conservative elements of Canadian politics which has allowed them to maintain at least
some nationwide popularity. Since renamed the CAP, the RP has served as the
opposition following the last two general elections.
While there are certainly some ideological differences and even regional
differences between the parties, they still generally fall into the category of catch-all
parties as described by Kirchheimer (1966). The movement away from a strong
ideological base has left parties vulnerable to the emergence of parties with similar
ideological tendencies but with stronger individual leaders or organizational skills (Mair
1989). While political ideology is not a focus of this thesis per se, the number of political
parties is possibly a function of the ideological distance between parties. The number of
competitive political parties is a critical component of Chapters 3 and 4. Since
compliance with Du verger's law is based on the number of political parties, how we
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measure that particular quantity is a very important issue that will be examined in depth
in Chapter 3. The number of competitive parties is also hypothesized to be a factor in
voter turnout so it factors significantly into the analysis in Chapter 4.
Contributions of this Study
Chapter 2 examines the impact of the timing of elections on the government party
in Canadian parliamentary elections. The study of the timing of elections has had its
focus mainly on presidential regimes. This literature explores the differences between
concurrent and non-concurrent elections, and how they impact the party of the president.
The timing of elections clearly has an impact on the performance of political parties in
presidential regimes, yet this area has received little attention in parliamentary studies.
Chapter 2 shows that this is an area that should receive greater study in parliamentary
regimes by demonstrating that the party that holds the position of government entering
the election is affected differently depending on why the election was called.
Chapter 3 turns to an evaluation of Canadian exceptionalism to Duverger's law.
This law states that the single-ballot simple-majority electoral system used by Canada
should produce a two party system. However, Canada is an often-cited exception to this
law because there are consistently more than two parliamentary parties. Duverger argued
that the reason that Canada appears to be an exception is that the two party competition
that he was referring to occurs at the riding (or district) level instead of at the national
level. He also states that the reason for multipartism at the national level is that different
regional parties challenge the national parties in different regions. This notion was
challenged by Gaines (1999) in a study in which he determined that two-party
competition did not accurately describe the national or riding level. Gaines also finds
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that there was no regional effect contributing to this determination. Chapter 3 adds to
Gaines' analysis by including the 1997 and the 2000 elections which confirms his results
as long as the same measures are employed. I propose some additional measures,
particularly an analysis of the competitive number of parties based on the share of seats
received instead of using votes received as Gaines did, that present a drastically different
story. This chapter calls into question the generally accepted method for measuring the
number of competitive parties and provides some empirical rather than anecdotal support
for Duverger's contention that Canada is not an exception.
The two primary approaches to the study of voter turnout address vastly different
sets of variables. The socioeconomic behavioral approach stems primarily from the study
of American politics and focuses on variables such as education and income (Almond
and Verba 1963; Campbell et. al. 1960; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman,
Brady and Nie 1993). The institutional approach is seen mostly in comparative studies
and involves variables such as the number of parties, type of electoral system, type of
government and performance variables such as the margin of victory and reelection of
incumbents (Gray and Caul 2000; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995; Studlar
2001). Chapter 4 presents a longitudinal analysis of Canadian turnout using the
institutional variables explored in Chapters 2 and 3 as well as a snapshot analysis of the
1997 Canadian election. For the analysis of voter turnout in the 1997 election, I use a
combination of socioeconomic and institutional variables in a riding level analysis.
The major contribution of each of these chapters is the demonstration of a need
for further research in each of these areas including a re-conceptualization of the
operationalization of certain variables used in the analysis. The findings in Chapter 2
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show that the study of election timing and its impact on representation should not be
limited to presidential regimes. Parliamentary regimes provide a unique area for study
because the government has some control over the timing of elections. If it can be shown
that timing affects outcomes, then the logical extension of that finding is that the
government has some control over the outcome of elections. The findings in Chapter 3
suggest that Du verger's regional explanation for Canadian exceptionalism was correct.
These findings are based on using seat shares in order to determine the number of
competitive parties instead of the traditionally accepted vote shares. The voter turnout
analysis in Chapter 4 includes a combination of the socioeconomic and institutional
approaches to the study of this phenomenon and demonstrates some of the flaws of
performing an aggregate level analysis. The aggregate picture is distorted by combining
regions in which the independent variables have profoundly different impacts.
Methodology and Data
Due to the vastly different nature of each of the three topics covered in this study,
there is no one methodology that is appropriate for all of them. Chapter 2 is mainly a
qualitative study in order to determine if there is merit for a broader quantitative study
into the relationship between the timing of elections and the impact that this has on the
party in government. Chapter 3 involves the use of mathematical calculations to
determine the number of competitive parties. Chapter 4 uses linear regression as the
form of statistical analysis because it is most appropriate for analyzing the relationship of
ratio level variables (including a single dummy variable). Each of these methods is
appropriate for the topic under discussion in each chapter, and they present logical
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opportunities for future research. Any single method of analysis is not enough to develop
a complete picture and will leave important questions unanswered.
I chose to use the single case study of Canada for each of these chapters in order
to maintain continuity between them. By focussing on a single country, it allows me to
control for many potential intervening variables while at the same time demonstrating the
need for further comparative study. The availability of the data was also a factor in the
decision to focus solely on Canada. The longitudinal Canadian election data makes the
findings of these chapters even more valid.
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Chapter 2
Impact of the Timing of Elections on the Party in Government:
Examples from the Canadian Case, 1940-2000

Introduction
An important area that is emerging as a focus of study in political science is the
impact that the timing of elections has on government formation. Much of the work in
this area has focused on presidential regimes and the impact that can be observed when
comparing concurrent and non-concurrent election results (Scheve and Tomz 1999;
Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart 1995). The discussion on election timing in
parliamentary regimes focuses on the use of no confidence votes to dissolve the cabinet
and the government and the implications for economic policy making (Huber 1996;
Huber and McCarty 2001; Johnston 1999; Petry et. al. 1999).
A commonly found feature in parliamentary democracies is a limit on the
maximum amount of time that can pass between elections. The government, however,
has the power to call elections before the completion of a specific time period. There are
three possible methods of selecting the time for a parliamentary election: The government
can choose to wait for the maximum allowable time, the government can call for early
elections, or they can be forced to hold them due to a no confidence vote.
In this chapter, I analyze the impact of the timing of parliamentary elections
through an examination of Canadian general elections during the period of 1940 to 2000.
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I have developed three hypotheses for this chapter, one relating to each of the possible
methods for calling an election:
Hypothesis 1: If the maximum amount of time passes between elections, the government

party entering the election will lose seats or at the most maintain their seat share. The
fact that they waited the full term indicates that there was no surge in their popularity for
them to capitalize on, and that they were attempting to maximize their time in power by
holding office until the end.
Hypothesis 2: If the government calls an election early, it will increase its number of

seats. The fact that the government has chosen to hold the election early indicates that
they must have a logical reason for doing so, and the most appropriate reason is to
capitalize on an increase in popularity in order to increase their seat share.
Hypothesis 3: If the election is held because of a no confidence vote, the result will be a

loss of seats for the government party. A no confidence vote sends a message to the
electorate that the government is incapable of doing its job and can quite possibly lead to
a change in the party in power.
There are several variables that I will look at to test these hypotheses. In each
case, the dependent variable is the change in number of seats after an election for the
party that held the position of government entering the election. The independent
variables are the reason that the election was called, the length of time between the
elections and the type of government prior to the election. The reasons for calling an
election have been outlined above and are fairly straightforward. An election can be the
result of a decision by the government to hold early elections, can be forced by a no
confidence vote or can be called in order to comply with the proscribed time limit
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approaching. The time between elections is simply the time that has passed since the last
general election. The type of government prior to the election can be either one formed
by a party that holds a parliamentary majority, or in the absence of a majority, a minority
government (a coalition of multiple parties is also a possibility but has not occurred in
Canada since World War I).

Election Timing in Presidential Regimes
As stated above, one of the primary focuses of the research on the timing of
elections revolves around concurrent and non-concurrent elections in presidential
regimes. Scheve and Tomz (1999) discuss the midterm loss typically observed by the
party of the president in U. S. congressional elections. They determine that this loss can
be attributed to the desire of moderate supporters of the president to maintain a balance
between the executive and legislature to ensure that they can provide effective checks on
each other. Shugart (1995), in both his individual work and his work with Carey (1992),
agrees with this assessment of non-concurrent elections relative to the desire of the
electorate to maintain a balance of power. The demonstration that election timing
influences outcomes in presidential regimes does not directly apply to my work, but it
serves as a basis to show that election timing is an important variable that should be
studied. Both the Shugart (1995) and Shugart and Carey (1992) pieces include findings
based on election timing in presidential regimes that are analogous to events in
parliamentary regimes and are discussed further below.
Shugart (1995) determines that concurrent elections in presidentialism are more
likely to produce a unified government. He also finds that the timing of non-concurrent
elections has a significant impact on their outcomes. According to him, elections for
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other offices that follow closely the election of the president generally show a growth in
support for the president's party and that this support decreases as the temporal distance
from the presidential election increases.
Shugart and Carey (1992) discuss the president's "honeymoon" period. They
determine that elections during the first year of the president's term are the most
beneficial for his/her party (Shugart and Carey 1992). As a final note on the honeymoon
period, Shugart and Carey (1992) contend that elections held during that time frame tend
to benefit third parties as well as the president's party at the expense of the second largest
party. These findings can have important implications in parliamentarism that are not
present in presidentialism. Since the government controls the timing of the next election
in many parliamentary regimes, they can use this increase in popularity (the so-called
honeymoon period) to their advantage by calling an early election to capitalize on this
opportunity.
Electoral Cycles and Parliamentary Regimes
As far as the research on electoral cycles and parliamentary governments, there is
a diverse range of topics covered, but not a significant amount of literature specifically
addressing the institutional rules and constraints covering election timing. Huber (1996)
identifies the need for more empirical research in the area of election timing, status of the
government (majority versus coalition) and governmental popularity among other areas.
He emphasizes that the presence of the confidence vote in parliamentary regimes is an
important element that deserves to be a larger focus of the study of parliamentarism.
Huber and McCarty (2001) examine the confidence vote by analyzing the differences
between regimes in which the prime minister has unilateral power to demand the vote and

18

those in which the cabinet must approve such a decision. They determine that both
circumstances can result in the inefficient termination of a cabinet and possibly
inefficient dissolution of the government.
Much of the research on parliamentary electoral cycles involves financial policy
(i.e., budgeting and tax increases or decreases) and the impact of economic events on the
outcomes of elections (Johnston 1999; Petry et. al. 1999). In a study of Canadian
provincial governments, Petry et. al. (1999) argue that economic policy is coordinated
with predicted election timing in order to maximize the potential benefits from positive
economic outlooks. They argue that the direction of causality is the important finding.
They find that the government's perceptions about the possibility of calling a new
election dictate its fiscal policy instead of the relationship in the other direction. In a
study of the political business cycle and government popularity in Canadian elections,
Johnston (1999) argues that there is a popularity cycle for the government party that
exists between elections regardless of the economic conditions. He finds that
government's popularity rises substantially closely following an election, then maintains
a small variation near that peak until the next election approaches when it crashes back
down to, or below, the level of the previous election. This parliamentary finding is very
similar to the presidential findings of both Shugart (1995) and Shugart and Carey (1992).
Lupia and Strom (1995) contend that the two games that are constantly going on
in parliamentary governments involve coalition building based on past results and an
effort to predict the results of the next election and plan accordingly. They also conclude
that the anticipation of the behavior of the electorate plays a critical role in determining
the stability of both the cabinet and the government (Lupia and Strom 1995). Diermeier
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and Stevenson (2000) build on Lupia and Strom's (1995) work and come to some
additional conclusions. They argue that as a government approaches its maximum
allowable time without an election, the benefits from staying in office decrease and
thereby lead to more minor events being capable of leading to the dissolution of
parliament.
Baron (1998) concludes that the length of the constitutionally allowed period
between elections as well as the argument about minor events becoming more critical as
the end of that period nears are the important factors contributing to the possibility of
government termination. He argues that the proper way to study the longevity of
parliamentary governments would be a combination of those two factors with an analysis
of the political attributes of the state and society focusing on cleavages, institutions and
party structure (Baron 1998).
In a finding that relates to one of the elections in this study, Weller (1994) shows
that Canadian prime ministers have never been expressly forced out by their party even in
times when they possessed very low popularity. Instead they make the choice to step
aside on their own terms for the most part, possibly under pressure to resign, but never
expressly removed from the position by their own party (Weller 1994). This is relevant
to the work in this chapter because the 1968 Canadian election was called in an effort to
consolidate the leadership following the resignation of a prime minister (Feigert 1989).
Implications
The electoral cycle and the timing of elections are important areas of study with
implications on different aspects of party systems, government formation and
government dissolution as well as policy implications. However, there is little in the area
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of election timing and its effects on parties in parliamentary regimes. The information
that does exist is mostly theoretical and speculatively based on opinion polls (Johnston
1999) or evidence from presidential regimes (Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart 1995).
I examine the reason that an election was called and the resulting effect on the
seat total of the party that held the position of government prior to the election in order to
determine if any patterns can be observed. The importance of this research is that by
presenting an empirical analysis of the relationship between election timing and the
electoral fortunes of the government party, I demonstrate that this is an area deserving of
the further inquiry.
Data and Methodology

There are four sources used for the data presented in this chapter. The bulk of the
data comes from Canada Votes 1935-1988 by Feigert (1989). This volume covers all of
the Canadian general elections during the 1935 to 1988 period. Information regarding the
1993 election was reported in Eagles et al. ( 1995) The Almanac of Canadian Politics.
Data for the 1997 election can be found in the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada's ThirtySixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis, and the 2000 election is in
the Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results Synopsis.
I calculated the change in the number of seats for the government party by
subtracting the number of seats that that party received in the previous election from the
number that they earned in the election in question. The same method was used to
determine the change in seats for the principle opposition party which was identified as
the party with the largest number of seats prior to the election that did not form the
government. Time between elections is also a subtraction calculation with all numbers
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rounded off using six months as the cut-off. The type of government and the reason for
calling the election have been determined from an examination of seat shares and the
brief descriptions about each election provided in the data sources.
For the purposes of determining if an election was called early or called because
of the five-year time limit, I set a cut-off point at nine months before the expiration. Any
election called with more than nine months remaining was coded as an early call by the
government. This was the hardest of the variables to operationalize because of the
arbitrary nature of the decision and the lack of literature to use as guidance. I chose nine
months because I felt that a full year would be too long to consider early while six
months was too limited. This decision will be revisited below in the discussion of the
results.
A strength of the data is that there were nineteen elections in the 1940 to 2000
period providing a good sample size for this initial study. A second strength that will be
discussed in more length in the analysis of the results is that there is a good amount of
variance in the values of the independent variables allowing for a more complete analysis
of their impact on the dependent variable.
The most significant weakness that I see in this data is in my calculation of the
change in number of seats. Since the base number used for the calculation is the seat
total resulting from the previous election, any by-elections to fill vacated seats that
occurred in the intervening period are not factored into the equation. I anticipate that
accounting for the changes in seat total between elections would have some effect on the
magnitude of the seat change. However, I expect that that change would be minimal
since the number of by-elections is generally very small and due to the magnitudes that
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were observed it is unlikely that this inclusion would have an effect of the direction of the
seat change, which is the critical component of my analysis. This does, however, present
a possible area for future expansion of this research.
As this is primarily an initial study into the impact of election timing in a
parliamentary regime, I have chosen not to attempt complex statistical analysis in order to
determine the precise relationship. The central methodology to this work involves an
examination of the frequencies of the independent variables and a preliminary assessment
of their relationship with the dependent variable of change in the number of seats for the
government party. This is the best method of analysis for the data in question due to the
primarily nominal nature of the independent variables.
Discussion and Results
An important fact to note is that there is some alternation of power exhibited in
these elections. As shown in Table 2.1, both the Liberal and the Conservative parties
spend time as the government party and as the opposition. They also each presided over
three minority governments during their terms in office. This is important to note
because it reduces the possibility that the conclusions made are party specific. If the
results are not party specific, then it becomes increasingly likely that they are a product of
systemic features. While a party specific outcome would have limited any findings to the
specific case of Canada and these particular parties, a systemic effect should also be
applicable to other similar parliamentary governments.
The first hypothesis was in regards to the effect of waiting the maximum possible
time (five years in the case of Canada) to call an election and its impact on the
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government party's seat change. I posited that the maximum length represented a lack of
opportunity for the government to gain seats by calling an election early and that the
Table 2.1
Government Party, Opposition Party, and Government Type Preceding Elections: 1940 to 2000
Year

Government Part:y

01mosition Part:y

T:yJ!e of Government

1940
1945
1949
1953
1957
1958
1962
1963
1965
1968
1972
1974
1979
1980
1984
1988
1993
1997
2000

Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Conservative
Liberal
Conservative
Conservative
Liberal
Liberal

Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Liberal
Conservative
Liberal
Liberal
Bloc Quebecois
Reform/Alliance

Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Minority
Majority
Minority
Minority
Minority
Majority
Minority
Majority
Minority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority

Sources: Munroe Eagles, James P. Bickerton, Alain G. Gagnon, and Patrick J. Smith. 1995. The Almanac
of Canadian Politics. 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press., Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 19351988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada.

result would be a negative seat change or no change at all. The seat change for both the
government and opposition parties as well as the reason for calling the election and the
time between elections can be seen in Table 2.2. This hypothesis appears to be correct.
The government waited the full five years in six of the nineteen cases under analysis. In
five of those six instances the government party lost seats, with the exception being 1940,
the first election in the study. The five losses were substantial as well. The smallest total
of seats lost was twenty-seven in 1979. It appears that waiting the full five years is not a
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good strategy for a government party to undertake. Possible reasons for this phenomenon
will be discussed below.
Table 2.2
Party Seat Change and the Reason for and Timing of Canadian Elections: 1940 to 2000

Year

Government Party
Seat Change

Opposition Party
Seat Change

Reason
For Election

Years Since
Previous Election

1940
1945
1949
1953
1957
1958
1962
1963
1965
1968
1972
1974
1979
1980
1984
1988
1993
1997
2000

8
-56
65
-19
-66
96
-92
-21
2
14
-46
32
-27
-33
-107
-42
-167
-22
17

0
27
26
10
61
-56
50
30
2
-25
35
-12
41
33
108
43
94
-10
6

Five Year Limit
Five Year Limit
Govt. Called Early
Govt. Called Early
Govt. Called Early
Forced
Govt. Called Early
Forced
Govt. Called Early
Govt. Called Early
Five Year Limit
Govt. Called Early
Five Year Limit
Forced
Five Year Limit
Govt. Called Early
Five Year Limit
Govt. Called Early
Govt. Called Early

5
5
4
4
4
4
1
2
3
5
2
5
5
4
5
4
3

Sources: Munroe Eagles, James P. Bickerton, Alain G. Gagnon, and Patrick J. Smith. 1995. The Almanac
of Canadian Politics. 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press., Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 19351988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada.

The second hypothesis involves elections that are called early by the government.
The anticipated result in this case would be a gain in seats for the government party. In
ten of the nineteen cases, elections were the result of an early call by the government. In
50% of these elections, the government party gained seats. While the picture appears to
be mixed, a reassessment of the operationalization of early election calls presents a
slightly different conclusion for each of the first two hypotheses. If the limit for inclusion
as a full five-year election cycle is extended to include all elections called within the final
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twelve months, four cases would be re-classified from early elections to full five year
elections. The results of this change as it pertains to the elections previously categorized
as early elections can be seen in Table 2.3. This change would adjust the breakdown of
full term cases to a total of ten, with two cases in which the government party gained
seats and eight instances in which they lost seats. This only strengthens the previous
findings in relation to waiting the full time to call elections. It also demonstrates that
these variables are highly sensitive to operationalization and that this is an area that will
need to be addressed in any further investigation.
Table2.3
Re-operationalization of Early Elections from a Nine Month to a Twelve Month Cut-Off

Year

1949
1953
1957
1962
1965
1968
1974
1988
1997
2000

Government Party
Seat Change

12 Month
Cut-Off Limit

65
-19
-66
-92
2
14
32
-42
-22
17

Five Year
Five Year
Govt. Called Early
Five Year
Govt. Called Early
Govt. Called Early
Govt. Called Early
Five Year
Govt. Called Early
Govt. Called Early

Sources: Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 1935-1988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., ThirtySeventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer
of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief
Electoral Officer of Canada.

After the re-classification, six elections are still considered to be early calls by the
government. Of those six, four times the government party gained seats and only twice
did they lose seats. Coincidentally, the two elections that represent government losses in
this category are 1957 and 1997 which also happen to represent the two longest durations
between elections among these six cases. This certainly seems to suggest that the
government benefits the most from calling an election early in their mandate; although,
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the results remain murky due to the operational sensitivity of the independent variable.
This finding is interesting in that it relates to the "honeymoon period" discussed by
Shugart and Carey (1992). The main difference in this instance is that rather than
capitalizing on the honeymoon period through party gains in municipal or other lower
level elections, the government party is able to tum their honeymoon into more seats in
parliament and a stronger position in government.
Another interesting note about elections that were called early by the government
involves minority governments. By comparing Table 2.1 to Table 2.3, it can be seen that
three of the six early call decisions (1965, 1968 and 1974) were made by minority
governments. All three of those early elections resulted in a seat gain for the government
party. In two out of the three instances, the seat gain was enough for the party to
establish a majority government. The possibility of gaining enough seats to form a
majority is a very good incentive for minority governments to call early elections.
The third hypothesis was that elections forced by a vote of no confidence would
result in a decrease in seats for the government party and most likely their defeat. As
Table 2.2 shows, there were only three cases in which this situation arose, and once again
the results are mixed. In two of the three cases, the government party lost seats and their
position. In 1958 the Conservatives not only gained seats, but they were able to switch
from a minority government to a majority party government. It is possible that this
instance is an anomaly but that would certainly require a larger sample size to determine.
There is one other extremely important variable that could possibly have had an
impact on the seat gain that I have not included in the discussion so far and that is the size
of the parliament. The number of members of parliament changed six times during the
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period under investigation. The first year in which each new assembly size was used and
the change from the previous size can be seen in Table 2.4. While it is undeniable that
Table 2.4
Change in the Total Number of Members of Parliament: 1940 to 2000
Year

Number of Seats

Change

1940
1949
1953
1968
1979
1988
1997

245
262
265
264
282
295
301

17
3
-1
18
13
6

Sources: Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 1935-1988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., Thirty-Sixth
General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of
Canada.

the number of seats available will have some effect on the number of seats that a party
wins, an examination of the elections that coincided with the changes in parliament's size
demonstrates that this does not present a significant challenge to my findings. In each of
the six cases in which the parliament's size changed, the government party's number of
seats moved in the opposite direction. When the assembly size was increased, the
government party lost seats, and in the one instance that it was decreased, the government
party gained seats. This could possibly be a backlash against the government for redistricting and a result of incumbents losing some of their advantage by having different
constituents. The exception to this rule that occurred in 1949 does not present a
challenge to my findings. The number of seats was increased by seventeen that year, but
the government party gained sixty-five seats. While the additional available seats may
have played a role in that increase, there was still clearly something else at work driving
the Liberal's seat increase as it is substantially larger than could be accounted for by
those added to the parliament.
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Conclusion
As the analysis indicates, the first hypothesis seems to be accurate. It appears that
using the full term allowable between elections is not a good decision for governing
parties. The general trend observed from both of the first two hypotheses is that the
longer the government waits to call the election, the worse their chances for gaining seats.
Conversely, it appears that the odds for success increase if the government calls the
election early. The earlier the better, and it is possible that this is a representation of the
honeymoon period commonly associated with lower level elections in presidential
regimes and the governmental popularity cycle identified in parliamentary regimes
(Johnston 1999; Shugart and Carey 1992).
It is also possible that there is a relationship between the full five-year wait and

the mid-term backlash phenomenon often observed in presidential regimes (Scheve and
Tomz 1999; Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart 1995). While the government party lost
seats in eight of the ten cases in which it waited near the maximum allowable time to call
the election, they only lost their position as the governing party three of those times. This
could be a demonstration of some level of frustration with the government from the
electorate and a desire to send a message without removing them from power. Another
possible manifestation of this phenomenon can be seen in the fact that in fifteen of the
nineteen elections under consideration, the opposition party heading into the election
either gained seats or maintained their pre-election level of representation.

29

To really test the third hypothesis would require more cases. Three cases are not
enough to determine a pattern (especially when there is a significant difference in one of
them). A larger sample size would be necessary to reach any real conclusions, and this is
true of all three hypotheses. While these results are important, it is impossible to make
larger generalizations to parliamentary regimes as a whole given the limited number of
cases. What I believe that this research does accomplish is to show that election timing
in parliamentary regimes is an area worthy of further scholarly inquiry. A cross-national
study incorporating other parliamentary democracies in which the government and
opposition have similar powers regarding the calling or forcing of elections would be the
best way in which to fully ascertain the impact of election timing on the fortunes of the
government party.
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Chapter 3
Canadian Exceptionalism to Duverger's Law: Gaines Revisited

Introduction

The premises and implications of Duverger' s law have been the subject of a vast
body of literature within the field of political science. Duverger states that "the simplemajority single-ballot system favours the two-party system"(l964, 217). He further
states that apparent exceptions can be explained away by factors such as regionalism
within states, or by looking at the district rather than national level. Du verger argues that
when a state has a multi-party system at the national level it is not an exception if there is
still two-party competition at the district level as long as there are different parties
competing in different regions. One implication of Duverger' s law is that electoral
design is the determinant of party structure within a state, specifically through
influencing the number of parties that exist. According to Duvergerian logic, a decision
to implement a single-ballot, plurality type system is destined to produce a two-party
system. While Duverger mentions that historical factors such as social cleavages may
also contribute to the development of two-party competition, this institutional factor is
perceived as the critical component (1964, 217).
Two of the most commonly noted exceptions to this "law" are India and Canada.
Gaines (1999) studies Canadian General Elections from 1935 through 1993 in order to
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assess the status of Canadian exceptionalism to Duverger's law by focusing on district
level rather than aggregate data. One of Duverger's assertions is that when it appears that
multi-party systems have developed at the national level in plurality-based systems with
single member districts (SMDs), the district (or riding as it is called in Canada) level is
still categorized as two-party competition (1964, 222). In other words, even though
several parties are represented in the national assembly, a country can still comply with
Duverger's law if the individual districts demonstrate two-party competition without the
same two parties competing in each district. Gaines finds multipartism at both the
national and the district level.
The purpose of this chapter is to extend Gaines' analysis by including data from
the last two Canadian elections that took place in 1997 and 2000 and also to incorporate
some additional measures in order to expand the findings. The hypothesis of this chapter
is that the appearance of Canadian exceptionalism at the national level also holds true
when examining the data on a riding-by-riding or district-level basis as long as Gaines'
methods are employed. I examine the electoral results from each of the 301 ridings for
the general elections of 1997 and 2000 and compare the results to those achieved by
Gaines in his earlier study as well as presenting some additional measures that diverge
from his findings. An analysis of the number of competitive parties based on seat shares
supports Du verger's contention that the presence of regional parties is the reason for the
multipartism at the national level.

Duverger's Law
Duverger proposed that single-ballot, plurality elections with SMDs tend to
produce two-party competition. He also proposed that "the simple-majority system with
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second ballot and proportional representation favour multipartism" (Duverger 1964, 239).
Riker terms the first statement Duverger's law and the second Duverger's hypothesis
(1982, 754).
Duverger proposes that there were two sets of factors influencing the
development of two-party systems under plurality elections with SMDs (1964, 224).
First, he discusses the mechanical effect that is characterized by fusion or elimination.
Fusion can be characterized as the absorption of minor parties by larger parties in order to
maximize electoral opportunity; larger parties can co-opt the ideas of smaller parties in
order to widen their voter support, and smaller parties can use this as a means to achieve
greater political influence (1964, 224). Elimination is a hybrid of what Duverger terms
the mechanical and psychological effects. Minor parties are under-represented under this
type of electoral system in terms of their relative share of seats as compared to their share
of the vote. Since only the candidate with the most votes is rewarded with a seat, parties
whose candidates perform well, but come up short of victory, receive no immediate
reward for their efforts. Unless they perceive that future victory is a legitimate
possibility, their goals can be more effectively met by joining forces with a larger party
bringing the larger party greater voter support in exchange for a stronger position of
political power for the members of the smaller party. Duverger contends that this
mechanical effect contributes to the psychological effect of voters not wishing to waste
their vote so they switch their allegiance to the major party that they are most closely
aligned with (1964, 226). As the voters see that the smaller party that they are aligned
with does not have a chance to gain representation on its own, they will support a larger
party in order to have a greater impact on who is representing them in government.
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Cox (1997) discusses both the mechanical and psychological effects that
contribute to Duverger's law. Cox concurs with Duverger's assessment that given the
proper knowledge (i.e., the relative electoral strength of parties or candidates or both in a
given election), voters will act strategically and produce a trend toward two-party
competition over time. Palfrey (1989) agrees that if voters act rationally, elections
involving multiple candidates should result in only two receiving votes. The critical
component of both the Cox (1987) and Palfrey (1989) analysis is that they rely on the
voters being completely informed and acting in a completely rational manner with the
strategic maximization of the impact of their vote being their ultimate goal. In other
words, they assume that voters will vote for the party that is closest to their ideological
stance and has a legitimate chance of winning instead of choosing which party to support
on a strictly ideological basis.
Blais and Carty (1991) support the institutional approach to studying voting
behavior by presenting an empirical study that demonstrates that anticipation by voters
and elites of the mechanical effect leads them to act strategically. They confirm that the
psychological effect is present but emphasize that since the mechanical effect influences
'

the psychological effect, it should remain the focus of study. Similarly, Taagepera and
Shugart (1993) state that the aggregate effect of individual actor's actions based on their
knowledge of the mechanical effects of political institutions are predictable and posit that
institutional design can therefore be a basis for broader, generalized models of political
behavior. Through his analysis of competitive party behavior, Strom (1990) also
emphasizes a need for greater exploration of the impact that political institutions have on
the behavior of parties and individual actors. Along the same lines, Neal (1998) states
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that future research in this area should shift from merely establishing a relationship
between institutional factors and party system development towards establishing
causation. The emphasis in the literature described above is clearly on the mechanical
effect which is the logical focus of study as it more readily lends itself to quantitative
analysis than the psychological effect does.
National or District Level Focus of Study
One of the major questions about Duverger's law is whether it applies to the
national or the district level. Du verger's main argument is based on national level
analysis, but he does address the relevance of a district level approach. He concedes that
the district races may be more individualized and that the simple-majority, single-ballot
system with SMDs:
... tends to the creation of a two-party system inside the individual constituency,
but the parties opposed may be different in different areas of the country. The
simple-majority system therefore makes possible the creation of local parties or
the retreat of national parties to local positions (1964, 223).
Gaines (1999) and Reed (2001) present individual country case-studies in which they
focus on district level data. In the case of Italy, Reed (2001) states that Duverger's law
should be seen as a two-step process. First, two-candidate competition is established at
the district level through the mechanical and psychological effects as described above.
Successful candidates will then gradually coordinate into two parties at the national level
in order to maximize their effectiveness and influence as legislators. Reed further argues
that these two processes are complimentary and that it will take time to establish twoparty competition on a nationwide level (Reed 2001). For Canada, Gaines (1999) uses
hypothetical strategic voting scenarios to demonstrate that while Duverger's law may
indeed appear at the national level, it is at the district level where it should be most
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strongly evidenced based on Duverger's explanation of possible exceptions. Gaines'
findings are discussed in detail further below.

Canadian Exceptionalism
Duverger addressed the possibility that Canada is an exception to the law. He
stated that the appearance of Canadian exceptionalism at the national level could be
explained away by two-party competition at the local level, with regional parties
competing in different areas of the country. His argument was that the Liberal and
Conservative parties were the only national parties, and the Labor and Social-Credit
parties were concentrated in certain provinces (Duverger 1964, 223). Gaines (1999)
begins with this assumption and proceeds with a district level analysis of Canadian
elections from 1935 through 1993 in order to test the hypothesis that two-party
competition is in existence at the district-level. His results show that this hypothesis does
not accurately describe party competition in Canada. Gaines (1999) finds that Canada
exhibits multipartism at both the national and district levels. I have chosen to extend
Gaines' research to include the 1997 and the 2000 elections in order to determine whether
or not the patterns discovered by Gaines have continued. In addition, this additional data
provides me with the opportunity to include other measures that Gaines did not use.
Since the data for 1997 and 2000 include the results from each individual riding, it is
possible to look at the margin of victory and the seat distributions for each province.
These measures tell a different story than that told by the measures that Gaines used.
Gaines' results are replicated in the 1997 and the 2000 elections, but there are
some questions posed below regarding the methods he used to analyze the data. I
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propose that a closer examination of his methods brings the results into question,
specifically by looking at the results for individual ridings and adding a measure of the
margin of victory. Additionally, I find that if the analysis is based on seat shares instead
of vote shares, Canada will not prove to be an exception to Duverger's law.
Data

Two sets of data are used in this chapter. First, there are the data gathered by
Gaines (1999) from the Canadian General Elections from 1935 to 1993. Second, there
are the additional data that I collected for the 1997 and the 2000 elections. This second
group of data can be found in the reports of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada
published in the Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997: Official Voting Results Synopsis,
and in the Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000: Official Voting Results Synopsis.
The variables of vote shares, seat shares and margin of victory were collected
directly from these sources. These variables were then used in calculations to determine
the values for the other the variables of the effective number of parties based on both
votes and seats, as well as the vote share total of the top two parties. Values for the vote
shares (the percentage of valid votes received) of each party for each of the 301 ridings
were reported in the Chief Electoral Officer's reports. The margin of victory was also
reported as a percentage, representing the difference in total vote share of the first and the
second place candidate in each riding. Seat shares were reported in raw numbers that I
then converted into percentages for the purpose of comparison to vote shares. Seat shares
are simply the percentage of available seats that a given party received. The value of the
top two vote percentage variable was calculated by adding together the percentage of the
vote of the first and second place candidate in each riding. Finally, the number of

37

competitive parties, in terms of both votes and seats, was determined by using the LT
index developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). The LT index is discussed in further
detail below and in the Appendix.
One strength of this data set is that it is longitudinal in that it goes back to 1935
and encompasses twenty elections. There were concerns mentioned in the literature that
the effects of Duverger's law take time to manifest themselves. This is not a concern
because of the sixty-five year period covered by this study. Another strength is that for
both the 1997 and the 2000 election, the data comprises the full 301 ridings. The large
sample size alleviates concerns that any findings might be anomalous.
Methodology
Laakso and Taagepera (1979) developed a method for measuring the number of
effective parties in elections (or assemblies) that is based on their relative size rather than
a strict counting of those receiving votes (or seats) or developing a threshold point (i.e.,
receiving greater than 10%). The LT index is:
N=

(LP? Y1

where N equals the number of competitive parties, and pis the vote (or seat) share for the
i1h party. Their rationale was that this measure provides an easy visualization of the
number of competitive parties, in contrast to the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration and
Rae-Taylor fractionalization indices, which also measure the number of parties but
produce results on a 0 - 1 scale (Laakso and Taagepera 1979, 23-24). I use this index
both because it is used by Gaines to ascertain the number of effective parties for the 1935
to 1993 period and due to its acceptance as the standard method for measuring this
phenomenon (Cox 1997, 29). For an example of the LT index refer to the Appendix.
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The top two vote percentage which is also used by Gaines and the margin of
victory are calculations based on the vote totals from each riding. If there is strict twoparty competition then the top two candidates should receive 100% of the votes. The
further that this value deviates from 100%, the less likely it is that two-party competition
accurately describes the riding (Gaines 1999, 841). I have included margin of victory
because it provides insight into whether or not there is really any competition at all
(which brings into question the results achieved by some of the other measures).
The LT index and top two vote percentage are appropriate measures for studying
the relevance of Duverger's law in Canada since they provide an estimate of the effective
number of parties and measure the distance between the top-two vote getters and the
Duvergerian hypothesis that they should total 100%. I include the variable of margin of
victory and an analysis of the number of competitive parties based on seat distribution
because I believe that they will demonstrate some of the problems with using the other
measures and stimulate some possible lines of inquiry for further study.

Discussion and Results
The addition of the electoral data from the 1997 and 2000 Canadian General
Elections to Gaines' data set has had the expected result of reaffirming Canadian
exceptionalism to Du verger's law. As can be seen in Table 3 .1, the average number of
competitive parties per riding, based on the LT index, in each province as well as at the
nationwide level remains above two in each case for the 1997 and the 2000 elections and
above three in several cases. As Table 3.1 indicates, the trends observed by Gaines have
continued, and two-party competition does not accurately describe Canadian elections at
either the national or district level.
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Table 3.1
Number of Competitive Parties in Canadian General Elections: 1935 to 2000

According to Duverger, even when multiple parties are represented in the national
assembly, under this type of electoral system we should still see two-party competition at
the local level with different parties in different districts. There are clearly parties that
perform well in particular geographical regions in the 1997 and the 2000 elections while
performing poorly or being non-existent in others. The two strongest examples of this
phenomenon are the Reform/Alliance (RP/CAP) and the Bloc Quebecois (BQ). The
RP/CAP party performs quite well in the west while having little electoral presence east
of Manitoba. With its base of support being Quebec separatism, the BQ is entirely
limited to Quebec and does not even present candidates outside of the province.
Table 3.2
Number of Competitive Parties Distributions for Canadian General Elections: 1935 to 2000
Year
1935
1940
1945
1949
1953
1957
1958
1962
1963
1965
1968
1972
1974
1979
1980
1984
1988
1993
1997
2000

Mean
2.68
2.26
2.70
2.36
2.37
2.46
2.24
2.70
2.64
2.69
2.52
2.64
2.51
2.48
2.43
2.53
2.69
2.75
2.89
2.68

SD
0.67
0.49
0.57
0.46
0.57
0.60
0.38
0.44
0.44
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.32
0.36
0.42
0.37
0.38
0.62
0.44
0.44

Minimum
1.24
1.25
1.60
1.17
1.00
1.00
1.57
1.47
1.39
1.64
1.21
1.50
1.44
1.36
1.48
1.52
1.51
1.42
1.72
1.50

Maximum
5.54
4.80
4.51
4.18
4.10
4.11
3.69
3.98
3.96
4.02
3.66
3.72
3.32
3.12
3.12
4.04
3.88
4.53
4.48
3.74

Sources: Brian J. Gaines. 1999. "Duverger's Law and the Meaning of Canadian Exceptionalism."
Comparative Political Studies 32:835-61., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada.
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While these parties provide evidence that there is an element of regionalism in Canadian
politics, the fact remains that, as can be seen in Table 3.2, the average riding more closely
represents three-party competition than two-party competition.
The second measure that Gaines (1999) used to assess Canada's position relative
to Duverger's law is the total vote share of the top two candidates in each riding. Under
Duvergerian two-party competition, this number is expected to be 100%. As can be seen
in Table 3.3, the data for 1997 and 2000 continues the trend evidenced by the 1935 to
1993 elections. The average vote share of the top two candidates has been lower than
85% in every election since 1962. The 75% average in 1997 represents the lowest that
this measure has been in the entire period under investigation, as does the 92.6%
Table 3.3
Average Top Two Vote Share Distributions for Canadian General Elections: 1935 to 2000
Year
1935
1940
1945
1949
1953
1957
1958
1962
1963
1965
1968
1972
1974
1979
1980
1984
1988
1993
1997
2000

Mean
81.6
90.6
81.5
88.0
88.l
86.l
90.3
80.9
81.8
80.4
83.7
80.6
83.2
81.8
82.5
82.9
80.4
77.4
75.0
79.6

SD
12.4
11.2
11.5
9.6
11.5
12.9
9.2
9.8
9.7
9.8
8.2
7.4
6.6
5.9
6.0
6.6
7.2
8.8
6.8
6.6

Minimum
41.5
52.8
55.2
62.4
57.8
51.9
61.4
52.7
55.6
53.4
61.0
63.8
65.3
67.5
67.0
61.3
58.8
56.3
54.2
63.8

Maximum
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
98.2
100.0
95.5
96.1
96.6
96.3
98.0
92.6
96.2

Sources: Brian J. Gaines. 1999. "Duverger's Law and the Meaning of Canadian Exceptionalism."
Comparative Political Studies 32:835-61., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada.
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maximum value in the same year. As recently as 1974, there was at least one instance
where the vote percentage of the top two candidates totaled 100% leaving no doubt as to
whether there was greater than two party competition in that particular riding.
While the results from the 2000 election do show a small increase across the
board, the 79.6% average top two vote share is still the third lowest total among the
twenty elections surveyed. With a gap of greater than 20% between the Duvergerian
expectation and the Canadian reality, this measure provides yet more support for
Canada's status as a legitimate exception to Duverger's law. The examination of both the
number of competitive parties and the vote share of the top two finishers, demonstrate
that Duverger's law is not in evidence in Canadian elections at the riding level. Both
variables show that strict two-party competition is not an accurate description of voting
behavior in this case.
Upon further analysis on a case-by-case basis, it becomes apparent that there are
some definite weaknesses with these measures. A fairly typical example of the weakness
regarding the LT index becomes apparent by looking at the results from the Calgary East
riding in the 1997 election. Five candidates received votes in this riding: The RP
candidate won with 45%, followed by a Progressive Conservative (PC) candidate with
24.6%, a Liberal (LP) candidate with 22.8%, a New Democratic Party (NDP) candidate
with 6.5% and a Natural Law Party (NLP) candidate rounding out the field with 1.1 %.
The LT index returns a value of 3.13 competitive parties in this riding (see the Appendix
for this example). While it is clear that three parties received significant electoral support
by achieving greater than 20% of the vote, the large margin of victory for the RP
candidate brings into question whether the LT index is a good measure of the number of
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parties competitively contesting an election. The 3.13 value for the LT index suggests
that there were slightly greater than three competitive parties in this particular riding.
However, no candidate was within 20% of the victor. If you combined the vote totals of
the second and third place finishers, they would have barely been able to defeat the first
place finisher. There is a large enough quantity of similar results from other ridings to
suggest that another method for counting competitive parties should be explored.
Table 3.4
Average Margin of Victory in Canadian General Elections: 1997 & 2000
Province
Newfoundland
Prince Edward Island
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia

1997
8.4
4.8
10.4
14.4
18.2
25.9
16.2
12.6
30.2
19.6

2000
28.2
8.5
11.3
16.4
19.3
26.6
18.0
20.5
36.8
25.6

Net Average

20.8

23.7

Sources: Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief
Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997.
Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada.

The average margin of victory helps to assess the value of the LT index as
indicated in the example of Calgary East. Table 3.4 shows the average margin of victory
broken down by provincial and national averages for the 1997 and the 2000 elections.
With five of the ten provincial cases in 1997 and eight of the ten provincial cases in 2000
exhibiting average margins in excess of 15%, there is significant evidence that there is a
lack of competition in general, let alone two-party competition. When it is taken into
consideration that Ontario accounts for over one-third of the electoral districts and has
average margins of victory greater than 25% for both of the elections, this general lack of
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competitiveness is further emphasized. This phenomenon is similar to the vanishing
marginals observed in the study of American politics. The general concept behind the
vanishing marginals is that the increase in margin of victory for incumbents is lowering
the number of races that are close, thereby increasing the incumbency advantage
(Mayhew 1975). Ansolabehere, Brady and Fiorina (1992) have found that even with a
large increase in the average margin of victory for incumbents over the last thirty years,
the percentage of incumbents who are defeated each year has remained relatively
constant. This finding seems to indicate that margin of victory may not even be the most
appropriate measure of competitiveness as far as future prospects are concerned, yet I
believe that it still is a valid measure of how competitive one single election is.
The results from the riding of Saint-Uonard--Saint-Michel for the 2000 election
illustrate one problem with the top two vote total measure. The 92.2% value for this
variable in this riding appears to be a strong indicator that two-party competition is
occurring. A closer look reveals that the LP candidate received 76.7% of the vote with
no other candidate receiving greater than 14.5%. It would be difficult to argue that this
riding represents anything other than single party dominance. Another problem with this
measure is exposed through an examination of the Windsor--St. Clair riding results from
2000. The 80.7% value for the top two vote share indicates that this riding does not
exemplify two-party competition. A closer look at the top three vote finishers shows the
victorious NDP candidate with 40.8%, the second place LP candidate with 39.9%, and
the third place RP/CAP candidate with 13.5%. The top two finishers are separated by
less than one percentage point and are over twenty-five percentage points above the next
best performer. This certainly seems to be a good example of a two-party race. While
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there are clearly some problems with the measures, even after further inspection it does
not appear that two-party competition is an accurate description of Canadian elections.
Table 3.5
Effective Number of Parties Vote-Seat Comparison for Canadian General Elections: 1997 & 2000

Province
Newfoundland
Prince Edward Island
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
Canada

Votes
2.82
2.61
3.36
3.11
2.74
2.88
3.24
3.25
2.54
3.02
4.09

1997
Seats
1.96
1.00
1.98
2.63
2.13
1.04
3.15
2.18
1.17
1.73
2.98

2000

Difference
-0.86
-1.61
-1.38
-0.48
-0.61
-1.84
-0.09
-1.07
-1.37
-1.29
-1.11

Votes
2.60
2.59
3.14
2.85
2.55
2.72
3.05
2.74
2.31
2.77
3.77

Seats
1.69
1.00
2.95
2.17
2.05
1.06
3.38
1.82
1.26
1.53
2.54

Difference
-0.91
-1.59
-0.19
-0.68
-0.50
-1.66
0.33
-0.92
-1.05
-1.24
-1.23

Sources: Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief
Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997.
Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada.

Another method for analyzing the impact of Duverger's law is to examine the
translation of votes to seats and then assess the number of competitive parties in the
parliament. Table 3.5 represents a comparison between the number of competitive
parties based on votes and the number of competitive parties based on seats for the 1997
and the 2000 elections. It is clear from the results for the number of competitive parties
based on seats that, in that sense, two-party or even one-party competition is a more
appropriate description rather than the multipartism suggested by some of the other
variables. This brings to light another important facet of the discussion of competitive
parties. What exactly does competitive mean, and how competitive can a party be,
regardless of vote share, if it is unable to tum votes into seats? According to vote shares,
Alberta, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island appear to be close to three-party competition
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in both elections, but when the seat distribution is examined, it appears that they are
closer to one-party monopolies.
A second important implication from the number of competitive parties in terms
of seats comes from a national level examination. The results of 2.98 competitive parties
in 1997 and 2.54 in 2000 indicate that there were between two and three competitive
parties in parliament for those years (see Table 3.5). When looking at the actual
breakdown of parliamentary seats, it is clear that the three parties having the biggest
impact are the LP with 51.5% and 57.1 %, the RP/CAP with 19.9% and 21.9%, and the
BQ with 14.6% and 12.6% in the 1997 and 2000 elections respectively. These numbers
suggest that regionalism might be an explanation for Canadian exceptionalism to
Duverger.
The LP is the only example of a party that has had success throughout the
country. Both the RP/CAP and the BQ derive most of their success from a particular
region. The BQ has never even run a candidate outside of Quebec. The regional nature
of party preference is examined in depth for the 1997 election by Gidengil et al. (1999).
They determine that the political agenda of voters differs from region to region across
Canada in the critical areas of ideological leaning and economic perceptions. Based on
his analysis of vote shares, Gaines (1999) rejected the idea that regionalism was the
explanation for Canadian exceptionalism. The seat share analysis presented in this
chapter indicates that regionalism does seem to be an appropriate depiction of the nature
of Canadian exceptionalism to Duverger's law. This area clearly deserves more
exploration, particularly in light of the fact that it was posited as a reason for Canada's
apparent exceptionalism by Duverger himself in his initial writings.
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Conclusion
After analyzing the data from the 1997 and the 2000 Canadian general elections
and comparing the results to those found by Gaines (1999), it is clear that these two
elections fit well into his findings regarding the number of competitive parties and vote
share of the top two finishers in each riding. The result of Gaines' analysis of both
variables leads to the conclusion that Canada is an exception to Duverger's law at both
the national and the district level. However, upon further examination, it appears that
these two measures may not be the most appropriate. Nevertheless, it does still appear
that two-party competition does not accurately describe the majority of Canadian ridings.
In most cases, either multi-party or one-party would be a better way to describe the
competition.
With the addition of the data for the 1997 and the 2000 elections, I have been able
to propose two additional measures (margin of victory and seat-based number of
competitive parties) that may provide greater insight into the true status of Canadian
exceptionalism to Duverger's law. If the measure of electoral success is shifted from
merely receiving votes to actually turning those votes into victories and seats in
parliament, then a different conclusion can be reached. This analysis supports
Du verger's contention that regionalism is the primary reason that Canada does not appear
to comply with his law at the national level. It is clear that in terms of seats, different
regions can be accurately characterized as two-party competition with different parties
involved in different regions. Further analysis along these lines can hopefully provide a
more complete picture.
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Chapter 4
Voter Turnout in Canadian General Elections:
A Longitudinal and Case Study Analysis

Introduction

Voter turnout is an important issue in any representative democracy. While it is
not the only measure of citizen participation, it is a measure that is easily quantifiable and
therefore is readily accessible for statistical analysis. The issue of voter turnout is of
particular interest in Canada due to the fact that turnout has been declining steadily over
the past few general elections (see Table 4.1). The purpose of this chapter is to analyze
the impact that several factors have had on the determination of voter turnout in Canadian
elections since 1940 with an emphasis placed on the 1997 election.
This analysis has two separate sections. First, I examine the dependent variable
of national voter turnout levels from 1940 to 2000 in regards to the independent variables
of the time between elections and the number of competitive parties. The time between
elections was discussed at length in Chapter 2 and the number of competitive parties was
the focus of Chapter 3. For the purposes of this analysis, voter turnout has been
calculated by dividing the number of ballots cast by the number of electors that are on the
list (registered voters). The time between elections is rather self-explanatory and is
measured in months for this analysis. The number of competitive parties has been
calculated using vote shares in the LT index that was described in detail in Chapter 3 and
the Appendix. I hypothesize that both of the independent variables will have an inverse
relationship with voter turnout. In other words, as the number of competitive parties and
the time between elections increase, voter turnout will decrease.
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Table 4.1
Nationwide Turnout in Canadian General Elections: 1940 to 2000

Turnout%

Year
1940
1945
1949
1953
1957
1958
1962
1963
1965
1968
1972
1974
1979
1980
1984
1988
1993
1997
2000

69.9
75.3
73.8
66.9
74.0
79.4
80.l
79.2
74.8
75.7
76.7
71.0
75.8
69.3
75.3
75.5
69.6
67.0
61.2

Sources: Munroe Eagles, James P. Bickerton, Alain G. Gagnon, and Patrick J. Smith. 1995. The Almanac
of Canadian Politics. 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press., Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 19351988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada.

The second part of the analysis involves an in-depth look at the 1997 election.
Due to the availability of demographic data for each riding, I am able to analyze voter
turnout for all 301 cases within this election. I have chosen to use a combination of
variables that represent both institutional and socioeconomic factors that influence
turnout. Based on the literature and the data that is available, I have chosen variables
representing the institutional factors including the number of electors in the riding, the
number of competitive parties, margin of victory and the status of the incumbent. The
socioeconomic variables included in this study are education, unemployment and income.
Voter turnout and the number of competitive parties are determined the same as
described above. Margin of victory is the difference between the percentage of votes
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received by the winner and the first runner up in each riding. The status of the incumbent
is a dummy variable representing whether or not the previous office holder was reelected. Education is operationalized as the percentage of the population of each riding
with a university education. Unemployment is the percentage of the workforce who are
without jobs, and income is operationalized as the average income among residents of
each riding. The number of electors in each riding is the number of eligible voters.
Based on the literature, I hypothesize that education and income will have a positive
relationship with turnout, and the other five variables will have an inverse effect.

Socioeconomic Status and Political Participation
Since the 1950's, a large body of literature regarding citizen political activity has
focused on a behavioral approach to voting and the impact of socioeconomic status
(SES). The literature has consistently found SES to be an important factor. With their
ground breaking and standard setting book The American Voter, Campbell et.al. (1960)
examined American voting behavior in the 1950's, focusing mainly on the 1956 election.
One of their many findings was the fact that SES and other demographic variables
impacted party choice among voters. The majority of their work centered on individuals'
political knowledge (or the lack thereof), which leads to party identification as the
principle determinant of voter choice. The ignorance and apathy among voters that they
discovered is a contributing factor to declining voter turnout. Almond and Verba also
expand this area with their classic work The . Civic Culture (1963). In this work, they
studied citizen participation in political activity in the U.S., Great Britain, Germany, Italy
and Mexico. While their study was aimed at a much broader theme, its relevance to this
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chapter lies in their identification of education and income as comparative variables that
had a positive relationship with political participation.
The importance of these particular variables was again highlighted in a crossnational study by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) and a study of participation in the U.S. by
Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie (1993). In their study, Verba, Nie and Kim
determined that increased levels of SES were a strong indicator of increased levels of
participation. This was particularly evident in the more industrialized countries in their
study such as the U.S. and the Netherlands. Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie reexamine the status of SES as a determinant of political participation and find that it is still
a strong predictor. They also determine that it is becoming increasingly important as the
gap between those with high and low SES grows and the issues that affect those who do
not participate get ignored. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) add variables relating
to resources such as community involvement and free time available to individuals to the
standard SES model. Nevertheless, they maintain that the traditional variables of
education and income are the primary factors that influence what resources are available
to an individual. In particular, they find that a minor increase in income can drastically
increase one's political participation.
Education and income are clearly considered to be important variables in the
study of voting behavior. They are also excellent variables to use in this study because
there is significant variance in their values across the 301 ridings. I have chosen to also
include unemployment because it is a further measure of the socioeconomic level of an
area and there are regions within Canada in which the rate of unemployment is much
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higher than the national average (See Tables 4.3 and 4.5). While these three variables are
not a complete picture of SES, they are certainly the foundation of that measure.
Institutional Variables and Political Participation
While the socioeconomic approach is primarily an American politics approach,
institutional analysis is an approach largely found in the field of comparative politics.
Gray and Caul (2000) determine that an approach that focuses entirely on SES cannot
completely describe levels of political participation, particularly voter turnout. They
point out that education and income have been on a steady upward trend over the last half
century but that voter turnout over the same period has been in decline. They argue that
institutional variables such as the electoral system and the number of political parties are
more important variables for comparative analysis of political participation. Studlar
(2001) also argues for an institutional approach and states that institutional variables such
.as margin of victory and number of parties should be used in concert with traditional SES
variables in any attempts to model political participation. He states that since
participation is shaped by so many different factors, the best way to develop a complete
picture is through combining the approaches.
Jackman (1987) finds that the greater the number of political parties that are
involved in an election, the less likely people are to vote. Jackman and Miller (1995)
present a cross-national study of voter turnout in the 1980's based on institutional
variables. Two of the variables that they focus on are of particular relevance to this
chapter. They find that competitive elections should increase the levels of voter turnout
(this is represented in this chapter as the margin of victory variable). Similarly to
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Jackman's (1987) earlier finding, Jackman and Miller (1995) also find that multipartism
depresses turnout (this is represented by the number of competitive parties variable).
One other institutional variable that receives a significant amount of discussion in
the literature is compulsory voting (Jackman and Miller 1995; Franklin 1999). Making
voting compulsory is certainly a way in which to increase turnout. While this is not
directly relevant to this study as voting has never been compulsory in Canada, there is a
related issue that is relevant. Prior the 2000 election, it was the responsibility of the
government to register all eligible voters. Pammett and Vickers (2001) posited that the
removal of this feature from Canadian politics is the primary cause for the significant
decline in voter turnout from the 1997 to the 2000 election (see Table 4.1). This will
certainly become a variable of greater importance if similar results continue to be seen in
future elections. At this time, it is too early to make a judgment on the impact that the
elimination of compulsory registration has had on voter turnout.
Data and Methodology
The sources of the data for voter turnout, time between elections, number of
competitive parties, number of electors, margin of victory and the status of the incumbent
are all from the government and have been used in Chapters 2 and 3. The variables of
education, unemployment and income were obtained from the Federal Electoral District
Profiles generated by the government agency Statistics Canada and are based on the 1996
census.
Voter turnout is reported as a percentage in each of these sources. A description
of the method used to calculate the number of competitive parties can be found in
Chapter 3 and the Appendix. Margin of victory and the time between elections are both
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subtraction calculations. The incumbent is identified for each of the ridings in the ThirtySixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis, and then I coded the
variable 1 if they won and 0 if they were defeated. Unemployment is reported as a
percentage, and income is reported in Canadian dollars as an average of the income of
residents over the age of fifteen. Education is calculated by dividing the number of
residents with a university education by the number of residents over the age of fifteen.
One strength of this data set is that there are nineteen cases for the first analysis
and 301 for the second which creates a good sample size. There are enough cases to be
able to assume with confidence that any observed trends are not anomalies. Another
strength of this data is that it represents a combination of the institutional and the
socioeconomic approaches that will hopefully create a more complete picture than either
approach would be able to do on its own. One weakness, already discussed in Chapter 3,
is the accuracy of the LT index in determining the number of competitive parties.
However, I still believe that this index is the best measure available to determine the
number of parties competing in a single election in a single district. Another weakness is
that for the socioeconomic data, the numbers are based on the population over the age of
fifteen which is below the voting age. Therefore, citizens who cannot contribute to the
voter turnout are influencing the measures of some of the independent variables. This is
an unfortunate element of the way that the census data was compiled, but it is unlikely to
have a major impact on the outcome of my analysis.
In order to test these hypotheses, I will use linear regression as the form of
statistical analysis. Regression is the most appropriate method because all of the
variables are ratio measures, with the exception of the single dummy variable for
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incumbency, and this is the method that provides the most powerful analysis with
multiple independent variables at this level of measurement.

Longitudinal National Turnout
The first analysis that I performed was with the dependent variable of national
voter turnout for the years of 1940 to 2000. The independent variables for this analysis
were the time between elections and the number of competitive parties in each election.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4.2. The R 2 value of .069 shows that these
independent variables do not explain the variance in voter turnout. Table 4.2 shows that
the number of competitive parties has a statistically significant relationship with voter
turnout (at the .10 level) and that that relationship is in the expected direction. As I
predicted, voter turnout decreases as the number of competitive parties increases.
However, the model has very little explanatory ability. The time between elections did
not tum out to be statistically significant.
Table 4.2
Regression Analysis: Nationwide Turnout in Canadian General Elections: 1940 to 2000
Dependent Variable - Voter Turnout

Time Between Elections 1
Number of Competitive Parties

Standardized
Beta
.016
-.420*

Adjusted R2 = .069
N = 19
Notes:

* p < .10
1 Time

between elections is measured in months.
Sources: Mumoe Eagles, James P. Bickerton, Alain G. Gagnon, and Patrick J. Smith. 1995. The Almanac
of Canadian Politics. 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press., Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 19351988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada.
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Part of the reason for the low R2 value is that there were only two independent
variables, and they both represented institutional factors. As the literature discussed
above suggests, electoral participation is influenced by many factors both institutional
and socioeconomic. The finding regarding the influence of the number of competitive
parties is important and will be discussed in further detail below with the analysis of the
1997 election. As that analysis also includes socioeconomic data, it will address the issue
of turnout combining the two approaches for a hopefully more complete picture.
Turnout in the 1997 General Election
As with the above analysis, the R2 value shown in Table 4.3 is not overly
impressive at .101. Table 4.3 also shows that five of the seven independent variables had
the anticipated sign. The number of competitive parties, margin of victory,
unemployment and the re-election of an incumbent were all inversely related to turnout,
and education was shown to have a positive relationship with the dependent variable.
The number of electors had a positive relationship, and income an inverse relationship
with turnout, both of which were unanticipated results. Table 4.3 shows that the number
of electors, the number of competitive parties, margin of victory and education were the
only independent variables to have a statistically significant relationship with voter
turnout.
Once again, this demonstrates that there is a substantial number of variables that
contribute to determining voter turnout. I included a range of independent variables that
covered both socioeconomic and institutional factors, yet there is still a significant lack of
explanatory ability from the model that I developed. A possible alternate theory is that
my analysis is too broad. Different variables may have a different impact in various
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regions which could create problems when an aggregate analysis is conducted. For this
reason, I present a follow-up analysis by breaking the data into regional groupings.

Table 4.3
Regression Analysis: Nationwide Turnout in the 1997 Canadian General Election

Dependent Variable - Voter Turnout
Standardized
Beta
Number of Electors
.139**
Number of Competitive Parties
-.325*
Margin of Victory
-.398*
Education
.255*
Unemployment
-.068
Income
-.122
Incumbent
-.024

Mean
65,327
2.89
20.8
22.2
10.6
24,813
70.1 1

Adjusted R 2 = .101
N = 301
Notes:
** p < .05
* p < .01
1 The incumbent was re-elected in 70. l % of the ridings (211 out of 301).
Sources: Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief
Electoral Officer of Canada., Statistics Canada Website <www.statcan.ca>.

Regional Analysis of Turnout in the 1997 Election
For this section of this chapter, I have divided Canada into five commonly used
regional groupings: The Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia.
The Maritimes include the provinces of New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia,
and Prince Edward Island, and the Prairies are made up of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and
Alberta (See Figure 1.1). Table 4.4 shows the results for these five separate analyses, and
Table 4.5 shows the mean values for each of the variables in each region. As Table 4.4
illustrates, no two regions have the same results. Only Quebec and British Columbia
have the same sign for all of the variables, but they differ in magnitude and statistical
significance.
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\0

Vl

.371
32

Beta
.570**
.095
.070
.128
-.571 **
-.540***
-.455**
.377
75

Beta
.098
-.681 *
-.544*
.500*
-.600*
-.287***
.100

Quebec

.238
103

Beta
.093
-.261
-.403**
.369**
-.129
.023
-.015

Ontario

.625
54

Beta
-.403*
.317***
.217
.453*
-.601 *
-.100
-.056

Prairies

.403
34

Beta
.245
-.375***
-.465**
.112
-.390
-.065
.214

British
Columbia

Notes:
All beta values are standardized.
*** p < .10
** p < .05
* p < .01
Sources: Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Statistics Canada Website
<www .statcan.ca>.

N

Adjusted R2

Number of Electors
Number of Competitive Parties
Margin of Victory
Education
Unemployment
Income
Incumbent

Mari times

Dependent Variable - Voter Turnout

Table 4.4
Regression Analysis: Regional Turnout in the 1997 Canadian General Election

0

0\

54,175
3.1
10.5
20.8
17.2
20,742
34

Independent Variables
Number of Electors
Number of Competitive Parties
Margin of Victory %
Education%
Unemployment %
Income 1
Incumbent2
69,029
2.7
18.2
19.6
12.2
23,059
71

73.8

Quebec

69,085
2.9
25.9
23.7
9.3
27,114
84

65.4

Ontario

60,180
2.9
22.0
22.5
7.5
24,216
65

61.2

Prairies

68,591
3.0
19.6
24.7
9.8
26,194
71

65.4

British
Columbia

Notes:
1 Income is reported in Canadian dollars.
2 Percentage of available seats retained by incumbents.
Sources: Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Statistics Canada Website
<www.statcan.ca>.

68.1

Dependent Variable
Voter Turnout %

Mari times

Table 4.5
Regional Means for Dependent and Independent Variables in the 1997 Canadian General Election

A closer look at Table 4.4 reveals that only the variables of education and
unemployment maintain the same sign across all five regions. In each case, education
shows a positive relationship, and unemployment is inversely related to voter turnout
(both of which were the expected directions). The case of Quebec stands out in that five
of the seven variables have statistically significant relationships with turnout, and of
those five, only income did not show the expected sign. It is also interesting to note that
in each of the five regions the R 2 values are significantly more robust than they were for
the aggregated national model. The R2 value for the Prairie Provinces (.625) is
particularly significant.
A few more interesting results become apparent when Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 are
compared against each other, particularly concerning the unemployment and income
variables. As Table 4.4 shows, the unemployment variable is statistically significant in
the Maritimes, Quebec and the Prairies. As shown in Table 4.5 the Maritimes and Quebec
are the regions with the two highest unemployment rates, and the Prairies have the lowest
unemployment. Another similar observation exists when examining the income variable.
The Maritimes and Quebec are the only two regions in which income is a statistically
significant predictor of turnout as Table 4.4 shows. At the same time, by looking at
Tables 4.5 and 4.3, it can be seen that these two regions are also the only ones in which
the average income is lower than the national average.
Table 4.5 displays some very interesting statistics. The Maritimes and Quebec
register the highest voter turnout, yet contrary to the hypotheses, they have the lowest
levels of education, highest unemployment and the lowest average income. In holding
strongly with the hypothesis that lower margins of victory will produce increased turnout,
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these two regions also have the lowest numbers for this variable. However, Table 4.4
shows that margin of victory is not statistically significant in the case of the Maritimes,
and it also has a positive sign.
Conclusion
The most important findings of this chapter have to do with the impact of the
number of competitive parties and the margin of victory on voter turnout levels. In both
the longitudinal national analysis and the analysis of the 1997 election, the number of
competitive parties was found to be inversely related to turnout and statistically
significant. It is understandable that this result may seem counterintuitive. It seems
logical that with more competitive parties participating, it is easier for a voter to find one
that approximates their viewpoint therefore encouraging voter participation. However,
the greater the number of competitive parties, the more work is required of the voter in
order to make a strategic choice. If there are only two parties for voters to choose from,
then they are not required to do much research, and therefore participation is relatively
easy. The more parties that contest an election, the harder it is to keep abreast of all of
their positions and their relative strength.
It should come as no surprise that voter turnout decreases as the margin of victory

increases. If the race is not expected to be close, then there is less of an incentive for
voters to participate and for parties to campaign. This also exposes a possible flaw with
using voter turnout as a measure of citizen participation and involvement in the political
arena. With large margins of victory, one would have to assume that the non-voters
would be drastically disproportionate supporters of the second place candidate in order to
think that increased voter turnout would impact outcomes. If there is no doubt in the
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outcome, then there is little risk undertaken by supporters of the predicted victor if they
choose to stay home, and there is also little incentive for supporters of predicted losers in
this scenario to inconvenience themselves by voting.
As was anticipated, and strongly supported by the literature, education was
positively associated with turnout at a statistically significant level. As this is an almost
universally accepted generalization about political participation, I will not take up space
discussing it here. Income is also widely talked about in the literature as being positively
associated with participation, and this analysis does not bear that out. Even though the
results were not statistically significant at the national level, they did indicate an inverse
relationship. In the two regions in which it was a statistically significant predictor, the
inverse relationship was also indicated.
On the national level, the results indicate that neither of these models are very
robust predictors of voter turnout. I have mentioned two possible explanations for this
above. First of all, it is certainly possible that both of the models are far too simple and
do not take into account enough variables. This is clearly the case in the longitudinal
model as it includes no socioeconomic measures whatsoever. A second problem that is
clearly seen with the analysis of the 1997 election is the effect that aggregation has on the
model. When the data was disaggregated into five separate regions, the models were
noticeably more robust. The strongest indication that aggregation has created a problem
in this instance is that there is clearly variance in both the sign and significance levels of
the independent variables across the regions. This indicates that there are probably other
variables that must be controlled for before attempting to analyze voter turnout across a
widely diverse population.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

Introduction
This thesis has covered three important topics in the field of political science and
has analyzed them using primarily an institutional approach. This work has served to
strengthen the contention that electoral system design has a profound effect on party
system development and both party and voter behavior. This concluding chapter will
highlight the findings of the previous chapters, some of the problems and weaknesses
with this research and suggest areas for future research.

Election Timing
The analysis of the impact of the timing of elections on the party in government
that was presented in Chapter 2 had three hypotheses, one relating to each of the three
reasons for calling an election. The first hypothesis stated that if the government waits
the maximum time allowable before calling an election the government party will lose
seats or at best maintain their seat share. My preliminary findings indicated that this
hypothesis has merit. After a re-operationalization of the cut-off for determining if an
election was called early or went the full term the government party lost seats in eight of
the ten instances in which it used the maximum time allowable.
The second hypothesis involved early elections called by the government and
stated that in this scenario the government party would increase its seat share. Based on
my preliminary findings, this hypothesis also seemed to be correct, but the findings
demonstrated how susceptible this analysis is to the operationalization of the variables.
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Shifting the time limit on early elections from nine months to a full year had a substantial
effect on the outcome. Before the reclassification, five out of ten cases that were
identified as early election calls saw the government party gain seats. After the
reclassification, the government party gained seats in four out of six elections. I will deal
with these operationalization and methodological issues in greater detail later in this
chapter.
Finally, the third hypothesis stated that if an election is forced by a no-confidence
vote in the parliament, then the government party will lose seats. There were only three
cases in which this occurred so it is impossible to come to any significant conclusions
regarding this hypothesis. This is a problem that exists with all three hypotheses. A
larger sample size would be necessary in order to make conclusions regarding Canada or
any larger generalizations to parliamentary regimes as a whole. The issues of sample size
and susceptibility to operationalization limit the explanatory power of the analysis in this
chapter. While these results show that future research in this area is warranted, these
problems must be addressed in order to enhance these initial findings.
The primary contribution of Chapter 2 was to demonstrate that the timing of
elections is an important area of study in parliamentary regimes. This is in contrast to the
majority of literature on the timing of elections which focuses on presidential regimes.
This analysis shows that there are some similarities between the two regime types when it
comes to the timing of elections and that since parliamentary governments have some
control over this feature, they have a unique way in which they can influence outcomes
that is not present in presidential regimes.

65

Canadian Exceptionalism to Duverger's Law
The hypothesis in Chapter 3 stated that multipartism is evident at both the
national and riding level in Canadian elections. This hypothesis is tested using the same
LT index method as Gaines (1999). Using this method, the results for the 1997 and the
2000 election confirm the pattern established by Gaines for the elections from 1935
through 1993. While this analysis shows that Canada is an exception to Duverger's law,
and is not characterized by two-party competition at either the riding or national level, a
small change in the method presents a drastically different picture.
By using seat shares instead of vote shares in the LT index, I find that Canadian
elections at the riding level are more appropriately characterized as two-party or even
one-party competition. This finding, which is the most significant contribution of this
chapter, concurs with Duverger's (1964) hypothesis that Canadian exceptionalism at the
national level is the result of different regional parties competing with national parties in
different regions of the country. As with the problem regarding the time limit for
declaring an election an early call in Chapter 2, this points out the sensitivity of many of
these variables to their operationalization.
Voter Turnout
The analysis of voter turnout presented in Chapter 4 used a combination of
behavioral and institutional approaches. The longitudinal analysis, which focused solely
on institutional variables, explored the hypothesis that both the number of competitive
parties (determined using vote shares in the LT index) and the time between elections
would be inversely related to voter turnout. Only the number of competitive parties was
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found to be a statistically significant determinant of voter turnout and that relationship
was in the expected direction.
The analysis of voter turnout in the 1997 election involved seven independent
variables. The institutional variables of the number of electors, the number of
competitive parties, margin of victory and re-election of the incumbent as well as the
socioeconomic variable of unemployment were all hypothesized to have an inverse
relationship with voter turnout. The socioeconomic variables of education and income
were hypothesized to have a positive relationship with the dependent variable. At the
national level, the independent variables of the number of competitive parties, margin of
victory and education were all significant at the .01 level and had the anticipated signs.
The number of electors was significant at the .05 level, but the relationship was not in the
hypothesized direction. Unemployment, income and re-election of the incumbent were
all inversely related to turnout (which was unexpected in the case of income); however,
none of the three were statistically significant. The R 2 value of .101 was not very robust
which indicated that these variables do not do a very good job of predicting voter turnout.
Chapter 4 also presented a regional analysis of the 1997 election which generated
some very different results. Not only were the R2 values much more robust than in the
aggregate analysis, but there was also substantial fluctuation between regions as to which
independent variables were significant. In fact, unemployment and education were the
only independent variables that maintained the same sign across all five regions. This
drastic difference between the regional and aggregate analysis is the major contribution
of this chapter.
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Suggestions for Further Research
Now that these conclusions have been reached the question is where do we go
from here? The most obvious expansion of this research would involve an increase in the
sample sizes. In the case of the election timing analysis from Chapter 2, this would most
likely involve the implementation of a cross-national study. There are several other
parliamentary regimes that could be included in order to extend the preliminary findings
that are presented here.
The analysis of Canadian exceptionalism to Du verger's law would benefit from
an extension of the seat share data to include all of the elections that were part of the vote
share analysis done in Chapter 3. The addition of this longitudinal data would either
enhance my findings or demonstrate that the 1997 and 2000 elections are exhibiting a
new trend with the presence of the CAP in the west and the BQ in Quebec bringing an
increased regional nature to Canadian elections. The additional seat share data would
show whether or not there have been regionally based parties contributing to Canada's
multipartism throughout the entire 1935 to 2000 period or that this is a new feature found
only with the recent emergence of the CAP and BQ. This data would also help to
determine whether seat shares or vote shares should be used in the LT index calculation
by significantly increasing the sample size.
The voter turnout analysis in Chapter 4 would also benefit from a larger sample
size and greater longitudinal data. Unfortunately, the census does not always correspond
with an election year which makes accurate socioeconomic data difficult to come by.
The demonstration that there is a drastic divergence between the regional and the
aggregate analysis leads to many possibilities for future research. This finding certainly
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calls into question the accuracy of any aggregate analysis in which there are substantial
differences between the regions. By narrowing the scope of the analysis, the number of
intervening variables that need to be controlled for decreases.
Conclusion
This thesis has shown that institutional variables play a critical role in party
system development and government formation as well as impacting voting behavior. It
has also demonstrated that some of these variables are highly sensitive to
operationalization and that a consensus needs to be reached in order to avoid problems of
measurement. This is especially true in areas such as the timing of elections in
parliamentary regimes because there is so little literature that focuses on this topic. Since
there is no literature on the impact that the timing of elections has on the seat share of the
party in government in parliamentary regimes, there was nothing to guide me in the
operationalization of the variables relating to that analysis. As more longitudinal and
cross-national studies are done in these areas, there will be a process of standardization in
the operationalization of these variables which will help to develop some consistency and
allow for broader generalizations to be made.
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Appendix
An Explanation of the LT Index with an Example

LT Index
Laakso and Taagepera (1979) developed a method for measuring the number of
effective parties in elections (or assemblies) that is based on their relative size rather than
a strict counting of those receiving votes (or seats) or developing a threshold point (i.e.,

r

receiving greater than 10%). The LT index is: N = ( LPi2 1 :
N = the number of competitive parties.

Pi= the vote share (or seat share) of the ith party.

Example of the Calgary East Riding in the 1997 Election
Five parties received votes in this riding. The RP received 45%, the PC 24.6%,
the LP 22.8%, the NDP 6.5% and the Natural Law Party received 1.1 %. The first step in
the LT index calculation is to tum these percentages into decimals so they can be used in
the equation. We now have .45, .246, .228, .065 and .011 as the vote share values for p 1
through p5 respectively. N equals one divided by the sum of the squares of these values:
N

= 1 I ((p1) 2 + (p2)2 + (p3)2 + (p4) 2 + (ps) 2)

N = 1 I ((.45) 2 + (.246) 2 + (.228) 2 + (.065)2 + (.011) 2)
N

= 1 I ( .2025

+ .060516 + .051984 + .004225 + .000121)
N = 1 I .319346
N= 3.13
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